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Introduction
To meet the development goals established in the National Plan , Honduras needs new and upgraded infrastructure throughout its territory. Private investment in capital projects will be vital in closing the existing infrastructure gap, currently estimated at US$900 million --nearly 5 percent of GDP. 1 The rate of public capital formation remains insufficient to cover this gap and, while some services (e.g. water and sanitation) have improved over time, the overall quality of infrastructure remains low relative to the regional average. 2 Some factors have prevented the infrastructure gap from closing. First, the rate of growth of potentially necessary infrastructure increased when Honduras entered a low growth phase. Second, the domestic market is underdeveloped, so the country has to rely on external sources for financing needs --bilateral and multilateral donors mainly. Third, the impact of the financial crisis, and the slow recovery of the main global economies, has slowed down or postponed important public investment decisions.
In the last decade, an alternative instrument has been widely used in an attempt to close the infrastructure gap. Public-private partnerships (PPPs) have been gaining significant importance as an alternative for financing much-needed public infrastructure and creating a fiscal space for the government to allocate resources to other--albeit less commerciallyviable-projects by allowing the public sector to leverage more financial resources, using the private sector as an intermediary to advance project investments. Under the leadership of the last two governments, the authorities have embarked on a series of reforms aimed at improving the investment climate and creating a better institutional framework for private sector participation in concessions and PPPs. The country passed a new PPP Law in 2010, with amendments in 2014 that strengthened the legal framework and created a more suitable environment for private participation in public sector infrastructure.
At face value, all signs indicate that Honduras is about to re-engage in a flurry of infrastructure activity. The country is making important commitments and catalyzing extensive changes to channel more resources into its infrastructure market. There are crucial challenges on the road ahead as the huge investment plans for the economy, the supportive legislation and the fiscal situation are currently not sustainable to catalyze the kind of transformative change that Honduras needs. The authorities will need to enhance PPP oversight and further 1 For more information, see World Bank (2003) . 2 The Gross Public Capital Formation has remained at an average of 24 percent of GDP over the period 2010-13. For more information, see World Bank (2013) .
strengthen the institutional arrangements surrounding the PPP framework, even considering the results of the previous amendments of the 2010 law that reinforced the role of the Ministry of Finance (SEFIN), including the establishment of a Fiscal Contingency Unit (FCU). The PPP program would also benefit from preparing detailed guidelines and methodologies on private partner selection, a public sector comparator, risk allocation, contract preparation, and other important elements that will help achieve value for money (VfM) from PPP projects as well as improving the accounting and reporting framework for PPPs. These are important and necessary steps that will eventually foster the Honduran PPP pipeline for national and international actors in a sustainable way.
Macroeconomic Developments
Following the signing of the Central American Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA) in 2004,
Honduras focused its economy on competing strongly with its Central American neighbor countries to attract foreign direct investment. It did so primarily based on offering low productivity offshore assembly for export, mainly textiles and other light industries. With the trade and investment regimes now largely standardized among the DR-CAFTA countries, competition is focused on who offers the lowest wages and the most conducive security environment. Honduras has found it challenging to emerge as a clear-cut winner in either category, as labor costs are often higher than in neighboring countries.
Growth performance during the 1990s slowed down, in line with some other countries in Central America (see Figure 1 ). While in the 1980s the average growth rate was 4 percent, in the 1990s it was around 2.5 percent. During the last decade, real GDP annual average growth jumped to a rate of 3.7 percent, supported by the dynamism of exports to the US as well as by remittances. Following the 2008 global crisis, though, growth rates have hovered around 2 percent. This deceleration path has been accentuated since the late-2000s, driven by lower private and public investment and consumption, lower levels of exports (see Figure 2 ), weaker than expected trade-partner growth, and political issues. Under current government policies, economic growth is expected to rise to 3 percent in the next two years , supported by faster U.S. growth and improved terms of trade. 3 Yet this growth could be hindered by the high fiscal deficits and the slow recovery of its main trade partners. public finance sustainability path. 4 The importance of budget rigidities associated with public sector operations-essentially related to public wages-should be highlighted. In Honduras, this line item accounts for 43.6 percent of total spending, mostly directed at the education sector, which limits the capacity of the government to allocate resources to capital expenditure, namely infrastructure projects.
revenue. Trade with the US has rebounded in the last year and the recovery in remittance flows has reached a record high above US$3 billion. 4 Given these highlights, the authorities and the IMF have negotiated a Stand-By Arrangement (SBA), approved in December 2014, including reforms to the PPP framework.
Setting the Scene: Infrastructure Challenges and Opportunities
As in many other countries around the world, infrastructure in Honduras plays a decisive role in economic growth, competitiveness, and poverty reduction. The extensive economic literature on the relationship between economic growth and infrastructure argues that, under the right conditions, infrastructure can play a key role in promoting growth and equity and, consequently, can help reduce poverty. 5 The conclusions of the studies indicate that countries can gain a great deal by improving investment and performance in infrastructure sectors. It is also true that achieving better outcomes requires institutional and organizational reforms that are more fundamental than simply designing infrastructure projects and spending money on them (Esfahani and Ramirez, 2003) .
Inadequate infrastructure has long been identified as an obstacle to higher economic growth in Honduras. 6 In the period 2000-13, total investment averaged 17 percent of GDP, which was noticeably below the average observed during the 1990s (20 percent of GDP). The adverse events that prevailed at the end of the last decade (domestic and international) slowed down the investment dynamism observed during the first part of the 2000s. 5 Most of the economic literature recognizes a positive relationship between infrastructure, economic growth, and human development. While it is argued that infrastructure cannot drive growth indefinitely and may be subject to large fluctuations, it seems that there is a growing perception that poor infrastructure has become one of the key barriers to growth and development in the LAC region. For more information, see Calderón and Servén (2010) . 6 For more information, see World Bank (2003) . The quality of the infrastructure matters as much as the quantity. The Global Competitiveness Report (2013) ranks Honduras 111th out of 148 countries with the most pressing need for improvement in the areas of: institutional capacity; citizen security; access to financing; and adequate quality and quantity of infrastructure. According to Calderón and Servén (2004) , improving the stock and quality of infrastructure in Honduras could potentially increase per capita GDP growth by 4.2 percent (3.1 percent from increasing the quantity and 1.1 from improving the quality) and could reduce income inequality.
The History of PPPs in Honduras
For quite some time, PPPs have existed in Honduras under the infrastructure concession scheme. While PPPs may not have been the term used to describe these arrangements, many of them were, in form and substance, close to the PPP framework that emerged later on. But as no regulatory framework was in place until 1999, there is no concrete evaluation of the PPP projects undertaken up to then and their efficiency was not always obvious. Even so, the number and size of PPPs was not very high (except for in 1995), and it was not until the second round of reforms to the legal framework that the number of PPPs increased (Figures 5 and 6 ). The country's absence of strong public institutions or well-defined policy-making decision entities and processes, and the set of sectorial laws that prevailed 7 , resulted in a lack of clear, strategic vision for the infrastructure sector, complicating the environment that governed concessions in the country. 8 In January 1999, the government approved the Promotion and Development of Public Works and National Infrastructure Law, giving formal birth to the first PPP law. The law recognized the country's lack of capacity on the programming and execution of mega-investment projects, justifying the need to establish a legal framework to allow for private investment participation. It established a concessionary regime for the provision of infrastructure and the management of public works, with no budgetary cap on the utilization of
PPPs. Yet, at the same time, the law excluded municipalities and decentralized public bodies, leaving key mega-projects out of its scope, such as the ones carried out by the National Electric Energy Company. 9 As a result, only one project was approved under the PPP law during the period that the law was in effect (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) ).
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7 The sectorial legal framework prevailed over the more specific PPP or concession framework. 8 Among the prevailing sectorial laws establishing their own legal framework are: (a) the electricity law (1994); (b) telecommunications (1995); and (c) the transportation sector (1998). 9 The electricity sector in Honduras represents around 3 percent of GDP. 10 Figure 5 and 6 are based on the PPP portfolio in execution (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) contained in Table 2 below. The PPP portfolio includes Build Own Operate (BOO), the Build Rent Operate and Transfer (BROT), and the Build Operate and Transfer (BOT) type contracts. Under BOO agreements there is no obligation to transfer ownership to the government at the end of the contract. BOOs are also normally used in sectors that have undergone a process of privatization or deregulation. Depending on each particular case, a BOO may or may not be considered a PPP. However, since governments sometimes provide revenue guarantees through long-term take-and-pay contracts for this kind of project, we include them in this analysis. Among all these projects, only the Airport Network used the legal framework established by the Promotion and Development of Public Works and National Infrastructure Law (Aguas de San Pedro de Sula also mentioned it, but being a local project was out of the actual scope of the law).
The Current Legal Framework for PPPs Norms and Regulations Governing the PPP Framework
To face the global economic downturn and the fiscal stress of its public finance accounts, in 2010 the government implemented a fiscal program aimed at reducing fiscal imbalances and improving the composition of public spending to give space for high priority investment. 11 In line with the need to prioritize and increase public investment, the government revamped its PPP program in 2010 by abolishing the first PPP law and substituting it with the Law to Promote
Public-private Partnerships (2010). The law-inspired by the Peruvian version-aims to strengthen the legal framework while correcting the flaws and loopholes of the first law by replacing the concession law and introducing a more expeditious process for managing, developing, and executing public works and services through PPP projects. The law is governed by general principles that include: public investment security; efficiency in public investment processes; fiscal accountability; optimality in the use of resources; competition; and economic and financial sustainability (see Box 1 for the most relevant articles included in the law).
However, the referenced law gives preponderant power to an organism created for the promotion of PPPs and makes it judge and jury in the contracts adjudication decision.
Amendments to the 2010 law to mitigate this agglomeration of power took place in 2014, but there are still some issues in the implementation process that need to be defined.
The current law defines-in a very broad manner-the term "PPP project" with the aim of standardizing procedures and establishing the scope under which the PPP program would operate. 12 It establishes the need to specify: the objectives of the project; the general conditions of the contract; the implementation period; the allocation of risks between parties; the required guarantees; and the criteria for establishing fees, prices, etc. It also establishes the form in which a PPP project can be implemented (allowing different legal settings), and that it may be structured through participation contracts, joint ventures, trusts, among others. The procurement process may be carried out via a local or international bid. In addition, it extends its scope of coverage by including municipalities, yet there is no direct mention of the role of public enterprises as agents that can pursue PPP agreements.
11 To achieve these objectives, the government signed an SBA with the IMF and committed to: improve tax administration and collection; control current spending; improve the targeting of social spending on the poor; improve the financial position of public enterprises and pension funds; improve banking supervision; and strengthen buffers in the financial system. 12 The law defines a PPP project as "any collaboration, scheme or common effort between the public and private sector (domestic or international) that adopts multiple models and establishes legal rights and obligations, determining and distributing risks among the parties involved".
BOX 1. HIGHLIGTHED ARTICLES OF THE HONDURAN PPP LAW
The law includes provisions to widen the scope of private sector participation in the supply of goods. It shows the endorsement of PPPs by the federal government and highlights efforts currently being made at that level: Article 3 establishes the principles of PPPs in Honduras, including legal certainty, efficiency, fiscal responsibility, resource optimization, fostering competition, accountability, fiscal and economic sustainability, balanced allocation of risks and benefits, local participation, fostering user rights and interests, and social responsibility. Articles 4 and 5 define the object and modalities of PPPs in Honduras that may include construction, the rehabilitation and operation of public works, the provision of public services, the construction and lease of a public work, and trust management. In 2011, the Honduran Congress approved the Investment Promotion and Protection Law (Ley de Protección y Promoci ٖ◌ón de Inversiones) that establishes a special regime for PPPs implementing "mega-projects and investment projects of national priority", and a detailed regulation of the Trust Funds framework. As explained below, through the Trust Fund model, the decree lessened the impact of the PPP law.
In practice, therefore, the new PPP law provides a formally complete legal framework covering all kinds of PPP projects. However, its implementation fell short of establishing adequate institutional arrangements and fiscal oversight mechanisms as explained in detail below. Some of these issues are addressed as part of the PPP law reforms that have just been approved by Congress (see Box 2 for a more detailed discussion on this proposal).
Limits on the Use of PPPs
Within the new law, Honduras adopted limits on the use of PPPs. The law stipulates that all quantifiable firm and contingent commitments undertaken by the non-financial public sector in PPP contracts, calculated at present value, may not exceed a limit equivalent to five percent of GDP. This percentage can be modified every three years by the President in the Council of Ministers, and in consultation with SEFIN, in order to be congruent with the country's capacities. 13 Such a limit can be modified with no need for Congressional approval. Restrictions on modifying the limit are not predefined, giving a discretionary power to the executive branch on setting future caps.
Using a simple approach we conduct a Present Value (NPV) analysis to calculate the gap between the current PPP portfolio and the 5 percent cap established by law to approximate for the potential total exposure of the Government under the current PPP program. 14 Based on the law, the PV includes all quantifiable commitments approved under the current PPP law, regardless of the instrument type (concessions, guaranteed revenue provisions, etc.). The results obtained using the PV analysis reveal that the combined current stock (see Figure 7) and flow of the current PPP portfolio accounts for 6.6 percent of GDP, of which 4.1 percent corresponds to the stock 15 and 2.5 percent is due to the flow of disbursements under the Minimum Revenue Guarantee (MRG) provision. Risk exposure reaches a peak by 2028, when the cumulative disbursements under the MRG account for 0.1 percent of GDP (see Figure 8 ). In the case of Honduras, the PPP contracts establish the MRG for each year in US dollars which poses a higher risk to medium-term fiscal sustainability. In addition, this trend could eventually lead to higher budgetary rigidities, since materialized payments for MRGs would have to be included in the following fiscal year budget. Figure 9 shows the total value theoretically at risk, rather than a probability-based estimate of the exposure, and is therefore not based in any assumptions for a probability calculation.
One potential risk that the authorities need to consider in the medium term is how the rapid growth of projects and the pipeline puts pressure on this limit. Given the long-term public sector commitments in the PPP program, the excessive use of PPPs can lead to a decrease in budgetary flexibility to adapt to the economic cycle through changes in public investment. In addition, not all commitments are quantifiable, 16 opening a range of possibilities for potential fiscal risks. A defining characteristic of the guarantees and other contingent liabilities is their intrinsic uncertainty in terms of the timetable and the amount of spending. This can pose a source of risk to fiscal sustainability, as the current law does not cover a wider scope of potential government obligations (e.g., obligations with estimated timings and amounts, obligations under mutually unexecuted contracts, and explicit and implicit contingent obligations, amongst others).
Relationship with Other Legal Frameworks
A key characteristic of budget preparation in many countries is that all relevant macroeconomic information and fiscal development can be prepared, analyzed, and presented in a mediumterm context (normally in a three year span). A consistent presentation of key fiscal indicators (e.g. revenue, expenditure, debt, etc.) founded on a credible macroeconomic framework, for a period beyond the annual fiscal year, allows the government to take into account events that fall outside of the annual cycle and to be better prepared for them. In Honduras, the spirit of the 2004 Organic Budget Law (LOP) is directed towards that purpose. The LOP established the formulation of medium-term policy instruments (see Table 1 ) so as to reach preconditions for well-informed and rational decisions on government policies that could strengthen the fiscal policy framework and fiscal sustainability. 2011-14 2012-15 1975; 1986; 1990; 1997 2011-14; 2012-15; 2013-16. 2006 1999; 2010 Source: SEFIN and Reyes-Tagle and Tejada (2014).
In practice, the policy instruments are weakly linked to each other, giving rise to different interpretations about mandates and responsibilities under the policy framework. The PPP law repeatedly cites or cross references policy instruments that have not been elaborated, are outdated, or might contradict what has been established. For example, on the PPP budget limits, the law that makes reference to the multi-annual budget has not been updated. 17 Also, the law stipulates budget provisions for fixed commitments or possible guarantee claims, which the debt strategy policy acknowledges, but provisions have not yet been established for those guarantees that have been issued.
Institutional Arrangements of PPPs
The PPP Unit
To strengthen the promotion, management, and implementation of PPP projects, the current PPP law created the Commission for the Promotion of PPPs (Coalianza) , an independent entity that is responsible for the contracting, execution, development, and management of PPPs in
Honduras. According to the law, all PPP proposals submitted to Colianza need to be accompanied by studies detailing either a cost benefit analysis (CBA) or an economic model analysis. The entity then proposes adding the project to the National Investment System (SNI).
After the project is listed in the SNI, the Fiscal Contingency Unit (FCU) determines the feasibility of the project as a PPP. Coalianza then coordinates the bidding process by tender or contest.
Coalianza has the legal power to execute PPP contracts and has entered into every contract 17 In the years 2011 and 2012, along with the Annual Budget, a multi-annual budget was elaborated. According to the Organic Budget Law (LOP), the multi-annual budget should be updated every year. However, the multi-annual budget was not elaborated in years 2013 and 2014. approved under the new PPP law, displacing other public institutions in charge of infrastructure projects.
According to Noe and Salgado (2013) , the institutional framework is designed for
Coalianza to displace other public institutions in charge of infrastructure, as the President can then approve PPP projects without the need for scrutiny by the Central Bank or the Planning and External Cooperation Ministry (SEPLAN). 18 Coalianza is also able to manage external resources directly, taking on the responsibilities of the Public Debt Management Unit. 19 In 2012, the Institute for Public Information Access granted Coalianza discretional powers over whether to release information to the public regarding feasibility studies, tendering processes, contracts, among others. 20 Additionally, before the reform Coalianza was the exclusive manager and processor for the contracts for PPP projects, as well as the specifications under the bidding process. Coalianza also collected fees for awarding projects (up to 2 percent of the contract value, which went into a trust fund), providing them with a financial incentive to approve and award PPPs, a severe conflict of interest given its role as an evaluation-and-monitoring entity of the government. After the reform the decision as to which projects can be carried out under a PPP scheme is the responsibility of the FCU. The FCU not only has the power to decide which projects starts as a PPP but also which ones are more suitable to continue as one.
Additionally, all fees collected by Coalianza and the FCU are deposited in the government's treasury, with agency funding determined independently of their revenue collection by congress. However the entire process after the FCU's decision still falls under the purview of Coalianza with little to no outside oversight, leaving some potential avenues for conflicts of interest. Coalianza is, therefore, a rather comprehensive PPP unit that, besides providing policy guidance and technical support, is also responsible for the promotion, and execution of the PPP program. As shown in Annex 1, PPP units around the world take different roles but almost all of them provide policy guidance and technical support. Promoting PPPs is however a less common role, attributed to only 16 out of 27 PPP units. 18 The responsibilities and resources of SEPLAN have been transferred to the newly created General Government Coordination Secretariat (SCGG). 19 Since PPPs are not directly considered to be public debt, the Public Debt Management Unit does not oversee PPPs, allowing Coalianza to accept public commitments (direct and contingent) without the control of that unit. 20 For more information, see: Noe and Salgado (2013) .
Main Issues Regarding the Implementation of the PPP Framework
Some stakeholders point towards a number of issues with the functionality, clarity, and enforcement of the current PPP framework. First, there is little appetite for using PPPs for social infrastructure where tolling is not relevant. Second, the current legal framework is considered unclear and sometimes presents contradictions with existing federal laws, such as with those relating to debt and transparency, which makes ministries hesitant to engage in PPPs. Third, the law might give too much institutional power to Coalianza by undermining the responsibilities that would, in principle, have to be carried out by SCGG (formerly SEPLAN) and SEFIN.
Balance and clear responsibilities are necessary to contain possible fiscal risks that could jeopardize fiscal sustainability.
In addition, it is difficult to obtain long-term financing due to the nature of project ownership rules as well as the limited availability of local financing. Securing long-term financing for PPP projects is a general concern of stakeholders in Honduras, mainly because only a small number of national banks can provide such large financing. Also, local debt financing is currently available for a maximum of 10 to 15 years. With PPP projects having a typically longer life, loans need to be refinanced at later stages of the project cycle. These lending limitations could discourage private investors as they pose additional risks to PPP projects. An added difficulty is the inability of securing fixed interest rates for longer-term financing, in part due to the limited financial instruments available. This also affects availability payments that the government would need to make for certain capital projects.
Highlights of the PPP Portfolio
A look into the PPP portfolio over the last 20 years (see Table 2 modalities. The former has the characteristic that the private sector designs, builds, owns, operates, and manages an asset with no obligation to transfer ownership to the government.
The two latter modalities have similar characteristics except that the private sector transfers the asset to the government when the operating contract expires, although it may subsequently rent or lease the asset back from the government. Coalianza has approved a total of 8 of the projects listed above since its inception and one additional project is in the tender stage for the present year. In addition, 20 Trust Funds have been created to structure PPP projects over the next years. 21 The number of projects approved so far, as well as the volume in the current pipeline (see Table 3 ), casts doubt on the quality of the cost benefit assessments as well as the institutional capacity that Coalianza has to evaluate and oversee such a demanding portfolio. 21 As detailed below, the Trust Funds´ main responsibility is to structure the PPP projects themselves. 
Other Key Institutions
As mentioned above, Coalianza plays a dominant role in the design and implementation of PPPs at the expense of SEFIN and SCGG, who should arguably play a more active role in the decision-making process as established by the PPP law, especially in terms of the connection with public investment priorities and process, public debt, and fiscal sustainability. Due to the 2014 reforms SEFIN, through FCU, is in charge of scrutinizing and monitoring PPP projects with the aim of reducing the latent danger that the PPP portfolio may become a fiscal risk in the medium-term. Table 4 below shows the main responsibilities and tasks of the entities involved in the PPP project cycle. 
The PPP Cycle and Approval System
Ideally, the process of implementing a PPP should be fully integrated with the national investment system (NIS) and the programming and execution of the public budget. Initially, government agencies should submit projects to be prioritized together with the government's infrastructure needs and planning. Subsequently, some of those projects would be designated to be implemented as PPPs because that option provides more VfM than the traditional procurement option.
The Honduran National Plan (2010-2022) and the federal government plan encompass the main policy areas and capital infrastructure needs at the federal, regional, and local level. Figure 10 ) and, before the reform, established whether a project is feasible to be implemented as a PPP. 22 This duty now resides with the FCU. There is currently no particular methodology for determining VfM when choosing between TIPs or PPPs. 23 The approach used by Honduras is that projects that can be funded via user tolls are brought forward as PPPs, thereby augmenting the national budget. It is important that the authorities strengthen the evaluation and methodology used during this step to assess whether or not a project represents VfM. The starting point for a PPP 22 For those projects awarded to date, neither the cost benefit analysis nor the public sector comparator is publicly available, limiting an assessment of the quality of the reports. 23 Within the PPP development process, the concept of VfM can be understood in general as an absolute benefit to the country implementing the PPP. In relative terms, VfM refers to the net benefit of implementing a project through a PPP relative to the public procurement option. To asses this relative VfM, the PPP and the public procurement option are compared using an analysis known as a public sector comparator or PSC.
VfM calculation is to compare the procurement solution to the TIP via the "public sector comparator" or a relative test.
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Once the FCU decides that the project can be implemented as a PPP, Coalianza's next step is to call for a public tender. It is worthwhile noting that, under PPP law, the general procurement law of the country does not govern the public tender. The PPP law establishes a specific process governed by Coalianza that actively participates and monitors the entire procurement process. Coalianza has the legal authority to execute PPP contracts, remaining a key player throughout the process. In addition, under the Investment Promotion and Protection
Law (the President can use discretionary powers to restrict potential candidates from the bidding process as well as to reduce the terms for the selection of the private partner for any investment project. Since real competition among private bidders is a key element driving VfM when implementing PPPs, discretionally restricting competition is clearly counter to best practice and also reduces the transparency of the process.
Once the project has been awarded to the private partner, the President of Honduras approves the contract and authorizes Coalianza to sign it. Once signed, the PPP project is sent to Congress to be ratified (due to its long-term nature, PPPs are approved by Congress through a legislative decree). However, given that the contract has already been signed, Congressional decision-making powers on the worth of the project are limited as hardly any changes on the agreed terms can be introduced at this point. Funding for projects is allocated in the ordinary budgetary process. As will be seen in the next section, the PPP approval process is not clearly linked to the budgetary process. As we will show below, the new approval cycle for PPP projects adds two new features that improve, in part, the monitoring of PPP projects. First, SEFIN will be present at every stage of the PPP's cycle-that is, from when the proposal is submitted until Congress ratifies the proposal. Though this suggests more controls in the PPP cycle-a beneficial development-the reform does not define how SEFIN's monitoring will function in practice. Second, the FCU will take the decisive role regarding what kind of projects can be implemented as PPPs unlike before the reform, diminishing some of Coalianza's power in the decision. 24 A public sector comparator compares the net present cost of bids for the PPP project against the most efficient form of delivery according to a traditionally procured public-sector reference project. The comparator is designed to take into account both the risks that would be transferable to a probable private party and those that would be retained by government. The public sector comparator then serves as a hypothetical risk-adjusted cost of public delivery for the project. 
Box 2. Reform to the PPP Law (2014)
The reform to the PPP Law took place in December 2014 and can be resumed in 2 main changes:
1) As we noted before, the decision concerning if a project could be implemented as a PPP is now a duty of the recently created Fiscal Contingency Unit (a new entity created due to the reform as a part of SEFIN). The cited Unit, has under his charges the measuring and monitoring of fiscal contingencies, and has the responsibility of elaborate plans of action in case of one contingency takes place.
2) The capacity of Coalianza and the SAPP for collecting a tax over the total cost of the project (2 percent and 1percent, respectively), still remain, 
Systemic Risk, Project Risk and Risk Allocation
More work is needed on procurement methods in Honduras to define, identify and measure systemic and project risks as well as risk allocation. Best practice emphasizes the importance of transferring project risks to whichever relevant partner is more efficient at managing such risks.
Appropriate risk allocation is often considered to be the key aspect of successful PPPs. The level of expertise in risk identification and mitigation in Honduras is very shallow. The lack of technical standards, specifically input specifications, is an area in need of great improvement for the government. To address these concerns, the government, through SEFIN and FCU, should work towards establishing standard contracts and VfM toolkits, including guidelines for developing a PPP risk matrix and undertaking quantitative risk analysis. Stronger and more efficient risk allocation is needed as one of the main principles of the PPP program in Honduras, together with the setting of evaluation criteria for SEFIN and Coalianza as the bodies responsible for PPP monitoring and evaluation. Also, establishing stronger safeguards 27 Legislative Decree 406-2013. However, it is proposed that this provision will be eliminated under the reform to the PPP law that has just been submitted to Congress (see Box 2).
throughout the full procurement cycle, including forecasting and planning, is another important step that needs to be considered by the authorities.
By developing a law that allows for different PPP models, the perceived regulatory risks that led some ministries to refrain from using PPPs should be minimized given the greater clarity of the legal framework. The law has opened the door to more complex PPP models that would be difficult to manage for a public sector that lacks the institutional capacity to analyze and process PPP proposals. Increased discretion provided under the law could also lead to greater opportunities for corruption; this would therefore need to be carefully managed, including through the use of appropriate integrity and transparency safeguards. For the law to be effective, it would need to be aligned with various sectorial laws, which currently are not linked.
It is unclear how different laws (e.g., the budget and land codes, the public procurement law, and the law on competition, amongst others) are integrated with the PPP law to create an investment climate propitious to private sector participation. The above increases the likelihood of opportunistic behavior from both the government and the private sector, decreasing the incentives of the firms to invest in public infrastructure. One fundamental issue with regards to the current Honduran legal framework is the multiplicity of input specifications (for example, specifying construction materials to be used for a project). The evidence illustrates that using this kind of approach significantly increases the cost of the project (Bajari et al., 2014) . PPPs can be more efficient than traditional public procurement specifically because the contract focuses on what is to be delivered, not how it is delivered. This is a more efficient way to allocate the risks between public and private sectors, and allows the private sector to use new and cost-saving technical and managerial techniques to reach specified results. However, stakeholders have emphasized that the authorities have a tendency to specify both inputs and processes, which can make the projects more difficult to manage and more expensive. Creating a framework that will unlock the efficiencies that the private sector can bring to capital projects will require more than legislative changes. There is a need to build capacity at the institutional level in order to move from specifying inputs to developing output-oriented specifications.
The effectiveness of the PPP governance framework will also depend on the broader administrative environment and investment climate. The government acknowledges that strengthening legislation is only the first step in setting up a robust PPP framework. Other elements must be aligned in order to create an attractive environment for private sector investments, and to engage in projects that improve citizens' welfare. International comparisons suggest that Honduras scores low with regard to the rule of law in several dimensions, including perceived undue influence of government on courts, corruption, uneven regulatory enforcement, and open government. Moreover, regional and municipal administrations seem to exercise very broad discretionary powers in the interpretation of regulatory requirements. So, while Honduras has a good legal framework that is comparable to international best practice, in actual fact its implementation falls below expectations given the systematic institutional weakness across the central government ministries, specifically in SEFIN. All this increases the systemic risk for the country in the sense that it generates a loss of confidence in the government that in some cases can create outflows of money from the country and difficulties in stress periods of crisis for the financial system.
The Ministry of Finance Gatekeeping Role
According to the law, financial and non-financial risks, guarantees, future commitments, and sustainable PPP program; without a strong methodology to ensure affordability, and a strong framework to ensure compliance, increases the fiscal risks of the government will inevitably increase as a result of using PPPs.
The Budgetary Process and PPPs
It is unclear how PPPs are incorporated into the annual budget; it is even less obvious how the pipeline responds to the national priorities established within the National Plan (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) (2016) (2017) (2018) (2019) (2020) (2021) (2022) .
While the national budget has theoretically established a number of steps, procedures, and a timetable from preparation to approval (key processes and timetables are presented in Table 5 ), the PPP active portfolio and pipeline has a structured process (see Figure 10 above) but lacks a timetable linked to the budgetary process. 28 In fact, the short-term nature of the budgetary process, as well as the existence of many off-the-budget activities, may be a factor in favor of approving PPPs rather than a de facto comparative advantage over TIPs (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2005: 26) . In addition, the lack of appropriate affordability controls may result in unrealistic forecasts regarding the actual cost of PPPs and the underestimation of the public commitments for which the government is responsible. 
Accountability and Transparency
Honduras is still struggling to define the processes and mechanisms of accountability for current PPP projects should not be overlooked, as it is advisable to avoid additional costs due to overruns and operational adjustments that might be directly absorbed by users in the form of development taxes or fees. While it is true that the quest to establish thorough accountability of PPPs is complex, given the involvement of many organizations involved in creating the entity or partnership, it would be possible to establish the entity's accountability through extensive consultations, transparent decision-making processes, and measurable outcomes that would reflect a compromise acceptable to all (Mathur, 2013) .
Several entities share responsibility over monitoring the implementation of PPPs. The PPP law created the PPP Superintendent (SAPP) to control the implementation of PPPs in Honduras (unless there is a specific sector regulator). 29 SAPP enforces the penalty system and reports annually to Congress on its activities regarding PPPs. 30 According to the PPP law, however, Coalianza retains the authority to oversee the implementation of PPPs alongside SAPP, but lost the authority to determine if a project can be implemented as a PPP, a duty that is now under the FCU. Coalianza fulfills its duties under the Transparency Law 31 and publishes relevant information on its website regarding PPP projects, including the signed contracts.
However, of those documents made available to the public, it is not possible to find the CBAs undertaken to demonstrate the economic feasibility and VfM of the projects. Moreover, no specific information regarding the fiscal implications of the PPPs is available in public documents, such as debt or budget reports, since SEFIN does not appear to be making their estimations of PPP-related commitments public, if they are conducting them.
Debt Management of PPPs
According to the LOP, SEFIN and the Central Bank share the responsibility for public debt management. The commission for public credit, formed by the two institutions and chaired by SEFIN, formulates the general policy for public debt. The latter is in charge of negotiating external public sector loans, although final approval requires the signature of the Central Bank and Congress. According to the LOP, all guarantees, deposits, and goods and services that are contracted by the public sector with third parties for a period longer than a fiscal year constitute public debt.
In the case of PPPs, SEFIN is authorized to issue the corresponding provisions in order to register the quantifiable firm and contingent commitments and guarantees that may be executed. All the guarantees and commitments of the PPPs need to be recorded in the Debt Management System. In practice, there is no clear link between debt strategy, debt management, and the liabilities (firm and contingent) acquired under the PPP program.
Presently, there is no public record of the guarantees and callable options under the PPP portfolio. In addition, it is unclear whether SEFIN is monitoring and assessing the progress of the guarantees and the probability of materialization. The PPPs could create a problem for the government since their fiscal costs are deferred over time. Instead of paying for a project during its implementation, the government starts paying only when construction is completed; this normally occurs after a longer period than the current fiscal year. This means that budget scrutiny is hindered, as no actual payments will be reflected in the budget until payments kick in.
As a result, it is not obvious that public financial management can ensure whether PPPs are affordable and therefore whether they are the best alternative method to finance projects. Mexico). The lack of a government-backed financial platform, along with the mentioned challenges in the internal financial market, make it necessary to grant financial support for PPP projects individually through the contractual structure. In order to 'un-clog' the PPP pipeline, some countries have established project development funds to help the authorities fund the heavy costs associated with developing PPP projects (especially mega-projects). In Honduras, a possibility would be to create a fund dedicated to roads in particular, in response to regional needs for resources to undertake large capital investments.
Operational Procedures
The previous PPP framework did not provide the appropriate incentives and financial support to develop projects, other than those based on the collection of user fees. Before the adoption of the new PPP law, only the BROT-type concessions were used in Honduras. Under the BROT scheme, the private partner is responsible for the improvement of the existing infrastructure and has the right to operate it for the duration of the contract, recovering the investment by collecting user fees.
The new PPP law did not address the lack of financial support platform but introduced new contractual features. For example, the first projects under the new PPP law were awarded under the BROT model but with an MRG clause that made them more appealing to private sector partners. The MRG clause is callable in the event that the user fees do not annually reach the yearly amount agreed between the private partner and the Government. Under this scheme, the Government compensates for the difference between the actual and the estimated user fee revenues in the following fiscal year. As a consequence, demand risk is only partially transferred to the private partner and the government assumes a contingent liability on these projects. This model has been consistently used by Coalianza and could be a source of fiscal risks via the explicit contingent liability included in these contracts.
The Trust Fund (Fideicomisos) Model
The new features of the PPP law were not enough to really foster the development of the PPP becoming the fiduciary administrator of the assigned assets whose first goal is precisely to find the private investors/operators. According to the mentioned law, the trustee can even issue bonds (guaranteed by the assets in the Trust Fund) to finance the project. For both terminals in
Puerto Cortes (container and bulk cargo) and the Gracias, Lempira road, a Trust Fund was created and a trustee appointed to structure and finance the projects. These projects went through the PPP approval process for the establishment of the Trust Fund before the project itself was structured and therefore before any potential public commitments were known. 
Box 3. The jurisdiction and responsibilities of the Trust Funds
• Undertake the necessary legal, technical, and financial studies for each project.
• Cash flow management: Collection of fees or other recurrent revenue payments for the operation of the project for the private operator, Coalianza, and SAPP.
• Selection of the private investor/operator.
• Financial structuring of the project.
• International and national promotion.
• Auditing of the project.
• Monitoring the management of the project once awarded.
• Creation of Trust Funds, SPVs, or other schemes for the adequate implementation of the project.
• Other specifics for each project.
• Manage the financing for the studies and the implementation of the project.
• Exercise the property rights of the Trust assets.
• Transfer the assets back to the government at the end the Trust period.
• Submit the required reports to the Technical Committee.
• Provide services with due diligence and compensate for any reclamation or legal action against the agent. Besides the above mentioned three projects already awarded, in the PPP pipeline there are another 17 Trust Funds approved as well as 2 more pending government approval or Congressional ratification (see Table 3 Overall, the use of the Trust Fund model increases the chance of PPPs being awarded and implemented, since the banks that have been awarded the Trust Funds have strong incentives to ensure the awarding of the projects to private operators. They can also additionally facilitate the financing of the PPP projects. Yet the model's main weakness is the lack of certainty that the projects will be well designed and structured and that they will generate the desired level of benefits. In addition, there are questionable incentives for the banks to ensure the quality and transparency of the projects and process. So, in summary, the use of the Trust Fund model encourages the implementation of PPPs but there are high concerns about the quality of the projects that result from it, and about the transparency of the process. 
Other Contractual Clauses with Fiscal Implications

Renegotiation and Disputes
Best practice underlines the necessity of maintaining VfM when renegotiating a PPP contract. In the first set of renegotiations, Coalianza accepted delays and assumed operating responsibilities, contradicting the spirit of PPPs where construction and operational risk should be transferred to the private partner. The modifications to the Corredor Logistico (November 2013 and February 2014) twice delayed the date for the beginning of construction. With the second modification, Coalianza also accepted that it would start collecting fees on one of the toll roads and use that revenue to finance part of the construction.
The other modifications have enlarged the scope of the projects after they were awarded, demonstrating a lack of appropriate planning. Under the previous legal framework, additional investments were incorporated into the Airport Network at an estimated value of US$ 3.6 million. In October 2013, less than a year after the original construction contract was signed in January 2013, an additional section was added to the Gracias, Lempira road. The estimated investment of the new section was 576 million Lempiras to be paid over 10 years, increasing the original estimated amount of 344 million Lempiras by 167 percent, and extending the period of payment by 2 years. In a similar fashion, an additional terminal was added to the bulk cargo terminal of Puerto Cortes in October 2013, also less than a year and a half after the original contract was signed in May 2015.
An Estimation of the Fiscal Risk
An estimate of the PPPs contingency in Honduras is presented. As we can see, the current portfolio of PPP projects would generate fiscal commitments the government until 2043, accounting for the biggest commitments over the next eight years (2013) (2014) (2015) (2016) (2017) (2018) (2019) (2020) (2021) . As shown, the base scenario projections constitute about payments and two types of intervals were defined, considering joint probabilities of occurrence, low negative-impact and high (green and blue line, respectively). Also, we consider two scenarios for low interest rate (3 percent) and high interest rate (6 percent) and we use it to determine future payments. As we can see, the difference between the projected payments and the contingent scenario can be up to 100 million dollars using the low interest rate for a given year and up to an additional $ 150 million using the high interest rate. That is, if you were to turn the fiscal risk, Honduras could end up having to spend the payments of its portfolio of PPP for a given year up to 150 million dollars additional.
Source: Author's estimation with data from PPI Project Database, World Bank.
Conclusions and Recommendations
In order to develop a sustainable PPP program and to catalyze infrastructure opportunities in the country, the government should focus on strengthening key institutional aspects before its ambitious and much-needed infrastructure investment plan can truly be tackled. These aspects include to:
• Improve the capabilities to develop a PPP program. A clear, transparent and well-managed program could foster investment opportunities under the PPP program. The authorities should strengthen the capability and capacity of SEFIN through the FCU and Coalianza to manage the size and scope of the PPP program. This means improving planning, structuring, and the analysis of risks.
• Despite SEFIN having a stronger role in the PPP decision-making process through the FCU as a result of the PPP Law in 2014, the challenge of implementing a technical methodology to evaluate and make the decision regarding the viability of a project as a PPP remains. A skilled team in the FCU is a necessary condition to make this happen, but other aspects such as transparency in the Cost-Benefit evaluation and VFM must be part of the implementation of the reform.
• In accordance with their duties of identifying, analyzing, monitoring and reporting on fiscal risks, the FCU must monitor and conduct evaluations of the following fiscal considerations:
-Central government contingent liabilities, including guarantees for PPPs and stateowned enterprise debt to accelerate a number of infrastructure projects and other prioritized projects, guarantees on liabilities and the equity levels of state-owned financial institutions such as export financing institutions, unfunded pension obligations, pending law suits and claims against the government, commitments to international organizations, liabilities with the Central Bank, and the fiscal risks of natural disasters.
-Sensitivity analysis, including the sensitivity of the budget deficit to changes in macroeconomic assumptions, the sensitivity of a hypothetical budget deficit that includes the contingent liabilities from the mentioned above bullet point, and the sensitivity of the net contribution of taxes, subsidies, transfers, and debt payments to changes in macroeconomic variables.
• Coalianza should not be perceived as a single unified one-stop-shop for PPPs. It should rather be understood as an agency capable of creating available capacity in various forms for assisting the procuring authorities in the PPP approval and implementation process. This may take the form of advice on good processes, the creation of standard contracts, training, and tools for assessing procurement modalities, VfM, and affordability.
• Improve the accounting and reporting framework by: (i) increasing the coverage of fiscal statistics and ensuring consistency in accounting of all capital spending, including PPPs, carried out by all levels of the public sector; and (ii) developing accounting and reporting guidelines for PPP operations to ensure comprehensive and transparent reporting.
• Strengthening the accountability process. There is no registration, accounting, or evaluation of the fiscal implications, risks, or commitments of PPP projects, at least available to the public, even when the FCU have it as one of its main responsibilities. It is therefore important that the government reviews and improves the institutional framework by strengthening the specialized PPP team in SEFIN (FCU) to oversee fiscal risks and assess project efficiency and budget affordability through the main stages of the PPP project cycle and rationalizing the internal and external monitoring and oversight functions.
• Strengthen the supervision and regulatory process of the PPPs at all stages (from design to execution). While two institutions have been created to supervise the implementation of PPP contracts (SAPP and FCU), they are still not functional, have not been staffed, and it is unclear how they will evolve. While SAPP is currently focusing on supervising the Trust Funds and projects in the energy sector and FCU is monitoring and approves the implementation of projects as PPPs, the fiduciary agents of the Trust Funds still have some responsibility for overseeing, supervising and regulating their own projects and contracts.
That is a notable concern and raises some issues about incentives and conflicts of interest.
One way to deal with this is by creating an autonomous organism that can supervise and regulate the process in a transparent manner. Finally, in Honduras, an additional possibility would be to create a fund dedicated to roads in particular, in response to regional needs for resources to undertake large capital investments.
• Standardize the development of PPP projects both under the Trust Fund model and the PPP cycle (through the FCU), the jurisdictions for undertaking and evaluating studies, and for structuring the projects. There are no norms or terms of reference for the Trust Funds that bind them to undertake analysis studies or project structuring in any particular way, so each Trust Fund does as it sees fit. In addition, studies are only approved ex-post by the Technical Committee.
• Allow access to relevant information. The lack of information availability, such as financial and economic models and other data essential for the authorities to evaluate projects, limits the assessment of the PPP program.
• Strengthen the Trust Fund rules and regulations. Under the Trust Fund model, even the role of Coalianza becomes mainly subsidiary, as it essentially only launches the public auction for the Trust Funds and participates as a member on the Trust Funds' Technical Committees.
